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Abstract
Regulations impose idiosyncratic capital and funding costs for hold-
ing derivatives. Capital requirements are costly because derivatives desks
are risky businesses; funding is costly in part because regulations increase
the minimum funding tenor. Idiosyncratic costs mean no single mea-
sure makes derivatives martingales for all market participants. Hence
Regulatory-compliant pricing is not risk-neutral. This has implications
for exit prices and mark-to-market.
1 Introduction
Increased regulations, and market changes, since 2007 have altered the perceived
costs of many financial products. Here we prove that these changes are not
just perception but that they have had a fundamental effect on pricing theory.
That is, we prove that a market-wide risk-neutral measure that is common for
all market participants does not exist. This proof is based on our Theorem
1 which states that if different market participants have different dividends
for holding the same stock then there is no market-wide risk-neutral measure
that is common for all market participants. We then demonstrate that due to
regulations, and unhedgable risks, different trading businesses do have different
holding costs for the same positions. This means that today all valuations are
private in the sense that they can be derived from idiosyncratic risk-neutral
measures (i.e. local to the individual pricing institution). Executable screen
prices are components of value, not valuations by themselves because of these
idiosyncratic and asymmetric costs.
Legally binding regulations require institutions to hold capital, e.g. CRD IV
in Europe [EU13] and Dodd-Frank in the USA [DF10]. Regulations also contain
liquidity requirements such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio [BCB11]. Bilateral
initial margins are proposed in [BCB13] as well as being required by central
counterparties whose use is mandated for certain product classes [DF10]. Thus,
in general, there are unavoidable capital and funding requirements even for flow
desks with fully collateralized back-to-back trades.
∗The views expressed are those of the authors only, no other representation
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If capital is provided at the riskless overnight rate, and liquidity used in
liquidity buffers is also provided at the riskless overnight rate1, then these regu-
lations have no effect on pricing. If capital and funding are not provided at the
riskless overnight rate, and different amounts are required by different institu-
tions for the same position, then we demonstrate that there is no market-wide
risk-neutral measure that is the same for all participants.
In theory, should investors provide capital, and funding, at the riskless
overnight rate to a trading business? If the (trading) business has risk then
no, and we will demonstrate in detail that trading businesses have unhedgable
risks. Furthermore, since the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio [BCB11] has
a minimum term of one month, overnight funding is not usable for funding
buffers. Thus there are at least two independent sources of additional costs
above riskless to a trading business. This appears to lead to the conclusions
that trading business must continually lose money. However, trading businesses
rely on competitive advantages to make profits — just like any other business.
Technically this paper adds to the literature on derivatives with holding
costs [Tuc92], rather than transaction costs [KS10]. It is also related to the
incomplete-markets literature [Cer09, KW09].
The main contribution of this paper is to show that regulations fundamen-
tally change pricing in that there is no common, market-wide, risk-neutral mea-
sure. A second contribution is to show how the concept of an exit prices can
be understood in the absence of a market-wide risk-neutral measure. We also
address marketing-to-market and the FVA debate.
2 No Market-Wide Risk-Neutral Measure
We use two steps: firstly we identify a technical condition under which no
common market-wide risk neutral measure exists; secondly we demonstrate this
condition holds in practice.
2.1 Condition for the Non-Existence of the Risk-Neutral
Measure
Definition 1 ([Shr04]). Let P be the physical measure, then a probability mea-
sure Q is said to be risk-neutral if:
(i) Q and P are equivalent;
(ii) under Q discounted stock prices are martingales.
[Shr04] shows that if the market price of risk equations cannot be solved then
there is arbitrage assuming that the cost of 1 unit of stock is exactly the negative
of -1 units of stock. In our case this is not true because holding costs are present
whether the position is short or long.
Theorem 1. If there are market participant with different idiosyncratic contin-
uous dividends when holding the same stock then there is no common risk-neutral
measure for all participants.
1We assume that a riskless rate is available to investors. This is not strictly required here
but we adopt it for convenience.
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Proof. Obvious. Let the stock price, from the point of view of market participant
i, be:
dSi(t) = (µi + ai)Si(t)dt+ σSi(t)dW
Pi(t)
where ai is the objective dividend received by market participant i, and µi is the
P drift believed by market participant i. This implies that in the idiosyncratic
risk-neutral measure of i, the evolution of the stock price is:
dSi(t) = (r + ai)Si(t)dt+ σSi(t)dW
Qi(t)
where r is the riskless rate. The P drifts of the market participants have been
replaced by the riskless rate, but dividends are unchanged because they are
objective although idiosyncratic. Hence there is no common risk neutral measure
for all participants because the rates of return are different participants with
different dividends (under each participants’ risk neutral measures).
If dividends were not idiosyncratic then all participants would see the same
risk-neutral measure. Usually the Girsanov transformations are idiosyncratic
but the final measure is common.
The condition for the non-existence of the risk-neutral measure, is that there
are participants with different holding costs (negative dividend) for holding the
same stock. It is clear that the theorem applies to any self-financing portfolio,
i.e. any derivative. The condition is not long and technical, rather it is simple
and direct.
2.2 Existence of the Condition
Here we show that different market participants have different, i.e. idiosyncratic,
holding costs for the same derivative. We do this in two steps: firstly we show
that different participants have different capital and funding requirements for
the same derivative. Secondly we show that capital and funding have non-zero
costs for market participants.
If capital and funding have different units costs for different market partic-
ipants then the conditions of the theorem are also fulfilled2. However different
unit costs are not required because we show that different quantities of funding
and capital can be required for the same positions.
2.2.1 Different capital and funding requirements for the same deriva-
tive
We can pick any derivative for this section3, and we choose interest rate swaps
as one of the most liquid derivatives. For concreteness we take the swaps as
being EUR currency and that the clients are in the Eurozone. Consider the
following setups.
2Unless these cancel out precisely, which is vanishingly unlikely over the whole market at
all times.
3We can pick any derivative because we are constructing a counter-example to the existence
of a market-wide risk-neutral measure that is common for all participants.
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Setup 1. Both banks have exactly the same trades This is shown in
the top half of Figure 1.
• Bank A has two back-to-back interest rate swaps, one with clearing house
C, and one with a non-financial client K. The swap with the clearing house
is collateralized, the swap with the client is not.
• Bank B has exactly the same setup as Bank A (i.e. trades with the same
client and clearing house).
The two banks will have different spot, and lifetime, regulatory capital require-
ments in at least the following cases. This list is not exhaustive.
1. Bank A has Regulatory permission to use Internal Models for VaR and
bank B does not.
2. Bank A is a Systematically Important Bank and bank B is not (because
systematically important banks have additional capital requirements).
3. Banks A and B are both Systematically Important, but with different
capital add-ons.
4. Bank A is European and the non-financial client is small enough that the
CRD IV exemption for CVA VaR for non-financial entities is applicable4,
and bank B is non-European where the CVA VaR charge has no non-
financial client exemptions.
Capital requirements include: Counterparty Credit Risk capital; CVA VaR cap-
ital; Market Risk capital; Default Fund capital. There will be Market Risk on
all the swaps because the swap rate on the client side will not be substantially
similar (i.e. within 15bps) to that on the clearing house side. The swap rates
will be different because the swap rate on client side will price in the possibility
of counterparty default (probably much greater than 15bps). The default fund
capital charge is not yet a regulatory requirement, but it is sufficiently close
that both banks will price it into their lifetime capital costs. Both banks will
have funding requirements, but these will be identical.
Setup 2. Bank B has two clients, not one This is shown in the bottom
half of Figure 1.
• Bank B has identical back-to-back interest rate swaps, one with clearing
house C, and one with another non-financial client K. In addition, bank B
has two more back-to-back interest rate swaps, another with the clearing
house, and the final one with a second non-financial client, L which has
the same credit characteristics as K. These further swaps are in opposite
directions to the first pair, but equal notionals. Hence bank B has offset-
ting swaps with clearing house C. All trades with the clearing house are
collateralized.
4See Article 381, point 4, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 amending Regulation (EU)
648/2012.
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Setup 1. Both banks have exactly the same swaps 
Bank A 
Bank B 
Client K 
Clearing 
House C 
+S2 -S1 
+S2 -S1 
Setup 2. Bank B has two clients, not one 
Bank A 
Bank B 
Client K 
Clearing 
House C 
+S2 
-S1 
+S2 -S1 
Client L 
-S2 
+S1 
Figure 1: The two setups described in Section 2.2. ±S1 and ±S2 stand for the
swap positions held by the different counterparties. The sign gives the direction.
The details of the swaps S1 and S2 (ignoring the sign) are identical apart from
the swap rate. The client swaps (S2) are uncollateralized so the swap rate takes
into account higher counterparty risk than with the collateralized swaps with
the clearing house (S1).
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Considering the back-to-back swaps involving client K, capital and funding re-
quirements diverge further between the two banks than in the previous setup.
We assume that bank B attributes funding and capital costs to each pair of
back-to-back swaps using a marginal-effect procedure. A marginal-effect pro-
cedure is where each item is removed to see its effect, and then the totals are
normalized. In this case an item would be a pair of back-to-back swaps.
• Funding requirements will be different for the back-to-back swaps with
client K between bank A and bank B, because (this list is not exhaustive):
– Initial Margin at the clearing house will be significantly lower for
bank B than for bank A.
– Variation Margin at the clearing house will be zero for bank B and
non-zero for bank A.
– Default Fund contributions will be relatively different for the two
banks, because of the netting of the two swaps with C for Bank B.
We assume the clearing house requires default fund contributions
from the banks according to their Initial Margins normalized with
respect to all clearing members. There are more complex schemes
but we make this assumption for simplicity.
• Capital requirements will be different for the back-to-back swaps with
client K between bank A and bank B (in addition to the reasons in the
first setup) because:
– Bank B has no market risk for the swaps at the clearing house because
they net exactly.
– The two banks have different Default Fund capital requirements from
their different default fund contributions.
This list is not exhaustive.
The presence of the addition pair of back-to-back swaps significantly alters fund-
ing and capital requirements for bank B. This is not just a change in the absolute
levels but also a change in the attributable levels for each pair of back-to-back
swaps.
Setup 3. Realistic portfolios The divergence of capital and funding re-
quirements, for the same derivatives, will hold for real portfolios. Banks have
different regulatory status, and varying portfolios with different netting benefits.
Banks may also have different stress periods for their Stressed VaR in Market
Risk.
Even assuming banks with indistinguishable risk levels, their portfolios and
regulatory status will produce different capital and funding requirements. How-
ever, we deal with risk levels next.
2.2.2 Capital and Funding are not Priced as Riskless to Trading
Businesses in Theory
This is the second theoretical step required to prove the non-existence of a
common market-wide risk-neutral measure. Note that this is a theoretical claim,
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we do not depend on whatever Treasury does — or does not — charge to trading
businesses in practice.
This step is required. It is not sufficient to show that different trading busi-
nesses require different quantities of capital and funding for the same derivative.
We must also show that capital and funding have non-zero costs. Otherwise
these requirements do not matter.
To prove that capital and funding are priced above riskless, we must
show that trading businesses are risky. We can show that trading busi-
nesses are risky by showing that they have unavoidable PnL5 leaks. There are
several basic PnL leaks.
1. All desks leak their institutional costs (IC), i.e. salaries and facilities.
Consider a flow swaps desk with only collateralized trades. If all its trades
are at-the-money (ATM) the desk makes losses the size of its IC. To pay
its IC it must be largely on the good side of the bid-ask spread. How
can a desk be consistently on the good side of bid-ask spreads? This is a
consequence of the business model of the desk. Now all business models
have some risk, hence the desk is risky.
2. When there is a funding requirement (e.g. Initial Margins) Regulatory
funding buffers are required and these create PnL leaks. The buffers in-
crease funding costs, per unit of funding, by changing the minimum fund-
ing maturity. Funding can be optimized, [KG13], but the cost remains.
The flow swaps desk in the example above may be one of the least risky business
models, but there is still some risk. Hence its funding (Initial Margins at least)
and capital (probably some Market Risk, Default Fund capital, and credit risk
on margin period of risk) will have costs above riskless from investors. However,
the capital and funding quantities can only generate the riskless rate of return.
Thus the funding and capital requirements multiply the risk of the desk.
It can be argued that the capital and funding requirements on the desk make
the desk safer. However, capital and funding make the desk safer from market,
credit, and funding risk — but they do not patch PnL leaks. The above-riskless
cost of funding and capital multiplies the PnL leaks and puts increased stress
on the business model of the desk, thus making it riskier.
We do not expect theoretical investors to perceive any derivatives business
as riskless. The institutional costs PnL leak of the swaps desk was simply a
basic example. Away from flow desks, business risks can increase, for example:
• Any dynamic hedging strategy. The risks here come from the finite hedg-
ing interval and the requirement that the hedging instruments remain liq-
uid. Over the crisis the liquidity in many markets changed and significant
gap events were observed.
• Any insurance-type contract, e.g. a CDS (credit default swap). Consider
the case where the reference entity defaults one day after protection was
bought. The protection-buyer makes a profit. Hence credit hedges do not
hedge in every state of the world. This is a significant difference relative
to, say, interest rate hedging.
5Profit-and-Loss.
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• Any incomplete market. Depending on how the market is incomplete and
the product there may be unbounded risks and requirements for dynamic
hedging.
• Costly changes in regulations. Regulations are generally well-announced,
but their exact timing and contents are often uncertain.
These unhedgable risks, together with institutional costs, mean that trading
desks are risky businesses even in theory. Thus they will be charged above
riskless for their funding and capital by investors.
We have now demonstrated that the condition required in Theorem 1 holds
and there is no common market-wide risk-neutral measure for all participants.
3 Implications
We consider exit prices, marking to market, and the FVA debate [HW13, Car12].
3.1 Exit Prices
Exit prices are required for many purposes and often defined as fair value, or
in accordance with an ISDA protocol [ISD09]. The non-existence of a common
risk-neutral measure for all participants is not an issue because the exit price
is of most interest to the two institutions involved with the position. The price
that preserves competitive advantage is an obvious definition. We call this flat-
idiosyncratic-exit. That is, the institution with the competitive advantage is
flat (no profit and no loss considering all costs). This is an idiosyncratic valu-
ation, but we have proved that all valuations must be idiosyncratic valuations.
There are two cases of interest: defaulted counterparty and existing counter-
party. Clearly the competitive advantage lies with the survivor in the case where
one party has defaulted. For existing counterparties the competitive advantage
generally lies with the party that does not initiate the trade exit.
In Accounting, Fair Value includes the idea of willing participants (i.e. specif-
ically not a fire-sale). Flat-idiosyncratic-exit ensures that the non-initiating
party is willing (no PnL effect) and that the initiator is also willing because
they were aware of the consequential loss due to their initiation of the trade exit
process.
3.2 Marking to Market
If all valuations are idiosyncratic, what does marketing to market mean? This is
a loaded question because, for example, an uncollateralized trade builds in the
risk of both counterparties and thus is not fungible. “uncollateralized market
price” is an oxymoron. Any market involving such trades can only ever involve
the original counterparties. Thus there are no market prices for uncollateralized
trades because there is no market.
Marking to market collateralized and cleared trades is also problematic. Few
cleared trades are standalone — what would be the business justification for such
an open position? Thus whilst the market level of swaps on a clearing house (e.g.
LCH) is observable, the trades only exist because they are part of some package
or hedging strategy. The clearing house side of such strategies does have visible
8
prices but these are only one component of a portfolio or netting set value. Since
clearing houses require posting of initial margin this cost, and capital costs, will
be included in any trading strategy involving cleared trades. Once bilateral
initial margin comes in [BCB13] these considerations will be universal. Thus
executable screen prices are part of valuation but only part.
Marking to market is an idiosyncratic exercise. Each market participant
has competitive advantages that dictate its business strategy with respect to
the market and hence its realizable valuations. That is, marking to market
must take into account the relative positions of the market players, there is no
homogeneity. Thus idiosyncratic prices are not inconsistent with the market,
instead they are exactly the expression of its heterogeneity.
Markets have observable prices, e.g. executable screen prices. However,
the properties of markets are not of central importance for market participants
given the non-existence of a common risk-neutral measure. What matters to
each participant are the replication prices that the participant can construct
using market prices as one input. Other important inputs are the participant’s
existing portfolio together with funding and capital requirements from Regula-
tions. Each market participant will derive different replication prices from the
same observed market.
3.3 The FVA Debate
Our view of this is summarized in Figure 2. Funding costs are part of the second
step in our development showing that there is no market-wide risk-neutral mea-
sure. This debate was started by [HW12] and continued in [HW13]. Essentially
the authors argue that “the evaluation of an investment should depend on the
risk of an investment ...”. Most authors agree with this statement, the disagree-
ments occur when applying the statement in practice. The original authors add
a further phrase “... , not how it is financed”, and it is at this point that the
debate starts. We note that a Nobel prize was awarded for the Modilgiani-
Miller Propositions [Mil88], which is an early replication, and makes the same
statement.
Our Theorem 1 describes a condition under which replication by individual
market participants will not create unique derivatives values for market partic-
ipants. We have also demonstrated that this condition holds in practice. Ironi-
cally, regulations that safeguard businesses from Market, Credit, and Liquidity
risks, do not block PnL leaks from the costs of the safeguards.
Regulations do not provide guaranteed profits. Profits are the domain of the
business model, and competitive advantage is required. Clearly, a competitive
advantage is a risk because there is no way to guarantee its future. Competitive
advantages have a lifecycle.
Modilgiani-Miller state that debt and equity investors divide the profits (or
losses) of a risky project between them. Since Modilgiani-Miller assume that the
investors do not change the project’s cashflows, or its risk, then the value of the
project cannot be affected by the investor mix (assuming an efficient market).
We have demonstrated, as part of our development, that the firm holding the
project does change the cashflows of the project, e.g. by the Regulatory status
of the firm. It is not only the Regulatory status of the firm that will change the
cashflows of the project. The firm will also change the cashflows of its projects
when it adds new projects, for example due to netting with clearing houses (as
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in our Setup 2.). Note that the changes in projects cashflows involve attribution
of costs, for example because of netting or capital. The changes in cashflows,
of course, also change funding requirements, which changes risk (at least in as
much as the funding requirements are volatile, and are not term funded). Hence
[HW12, HW13] are incorrect because the assumptions of Modilgiani-Miller do
not hold.
It may appear that our Theorem 1 implies that there are widespread arbi-
trage opportunities. In fact, just the existence of different Regulatory regimes
implies differences in costs for the same positions. This is not theory but Law.
In theory too, holding costs can create arbitrage opportunities [Tuc92]. The fact
that arbitrage potentially exists in theory does not mean that it is exploitable.
We leave it for empirical studies to quantify how much arbitrage this leads to
in practice.The FVA Debate 
Capital Modelling Under Basel III RWA-Calculation- & -Price-driven Behavior 44 
FVA proves that the 
Black-Scholes-
Merton assumptions 
do not hold 
The Black-Scholes-
Merton assumptions 
prove that FVA does 
not exist 
Figure 2: A view of the FVA debate. Funding costs are part of the second step
in our development showing that there is no market-wide risk-neutral measure
shared by all participants.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Regulators are clearly not risk neutral, i.e. having linear and identical prefer-
ences either side of break-even for derivatives. In practice the regulations on
capital and funding in Basel III, together with the inherent riskiness of deriva-
tives businesses, have imposed idiosyncratic holding costs for derivatives on
market participants. These idiosyncratic holding costs mean that there is no
market-wide risk-neutral measure that is common for all participants. Instead
each participant has their own idiosyncratic risk-neutral measure (or measures
plural in as much as a market is incomplete). Thus regulation has fundamen-
tally changed pricing theory. Exit prices can be approached with this new
understanding, i.e. as idiosyncratic-flat prices. Marking to market uncollater-
alized trades is problematic precisely because of the non-existence of a common
market-wide risk-neutral measure.
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